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At its simplest, any formal review of the type of electoral system that South Africa has, has 
three broad options.  Firstly, it could conclude that things should be left as they are.  Secondly, 
it could conclude that radical reforms are necessary and call for a shift to a fundamentally 
different system based only on constituency representation.  Or thirdly, it could call for 
moderate reforms to address the weaknesses of a proportional representation system by 
infusing it with elements of constituency representation, while guaranteeing overall 
proportionality of legislative seats to votes.  
To what extent can the views of ordinary South Africans inform such a choice?  The 
task of measuring citizens’ preferences on this issue is daunting even to the most optimistic 
public opinion researcher.  Certainly, those South Africans who have voted in both national 
and local government elections now have at least some exposure to different kinds of 
electoral systems, to which middle-aged and older white citizens add the memories of a 
purely constituent based system.  However, the degree to which people have internalised 
what happens once they cast their vote, or its implications for the behaviour of elected 
officials and party leaders, is certainly open to question. 
In order to provide the Electoral Task Team with the most useful information on public 
attitudes, this survey of public opinion focuses, firstly, on measuring public views of the system 
they have in front of them and, secondly on assessing what they want out of a voting system 
in general.  The responses reveal the following conclusions to the three broad choices 
outlined above. 
There would be little public support for a radical shift toward a first-past-the-post, 
single-member constituency system.  This is good news for the ETT since the Constitution 
requires that any system result ‘in general, in proportional representation’.  In fact, South 
Africans appreciate the achievements of the current system that maximises many values that 
a first-past-the-post system would have difficulty providing, such as proportionality, and also 
maximum inclusiveness and fairness.  There is minimal preference for the type of candidate 
centered, United States-style weak party system that a first-past-the-post system can 
encourage.  Indeed, for the most part, people are happy with the present system. 
If South Africans are generally satisfied with what they have, does this mean that the 
ETT should say simply: ‘If it ain’t broke, don’t fix it’?  We feel the evidence provided by the 
survey answers in the negative.  First of all, public satisfaction with the current system is neither 
consensual nor widespread.  Significantly higher proportions are dissatisfied than one would 
prefer, given that a voting system is an integral part of the overall constitutional framework.  
Secondly, while South Africans appreciate that the existing system produces proportionality, 
inclusiveness and fairness, they also emphasize other values that a pure list-based version of 
proportional representation has difficulty producing: values such as independent-minded 
legislators accountable to local grass roots public opinion.  
Finally, far from saying ‘it ain’t broke’, other survey results suggest strongly that the 
system is ‘broke’ in at least one very important way.  While Parliament has tried to address the 
lack of a direct connection between the people and the legislature by assigning putative 
constituencies to MPs, very few South Africans contact their MPs, and evidence from other 
surveys demonstrates that few people can even hazard a guess about who their MP is 
supposed to be.  Perhaps most damning, this survey shows that just one in five South Africans 
think that national and provincial legislators listen to the opinions of ordinary citizens or look 
out for their interests.  Left unchecked, such views threaten to turn into a cancer in the body 
politic that slowly eats away at public confidence in democratic institutions. 
The introduction of a constituency system would not, in itself, resolve all the issues 
giving rise to voters’ perceptions that South Africa’s politicians do not care about their needs 
or opinions.  However, introducing some form of constituency system would provide a direct 
link between voters and their representatives, thereby enhancing the sense of obligation of 
the latter to the former.  The responses reported in this survey suggest that voters would 
support the introduction of a Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) system, featuring the 
introduction of multi-member constituencies.  Such a reformed system would maintain overall 
representativeness (as well as other favoured electoral values like fairness and equality) whilst 





The Electoral Task Team (ETT), chaired by Dr. Frederick Van Zyl Slabbert, was established by Dr. 
Mangosuthu Buthelezi, Minister of Home Affairs in May 2002.  Its purpose was to review the 
current electoral system and recommend any reforms in time for the next general election.  
Any such reforms have to be implemented in terms of Sections 4 (1) of the 1996 Constitution 
(Act No. 108 of 1996) which states that the National Assembly shall consist of no fewer than 
350 and no more than 400 members elected through an electoral system that: 
(a) is prescribed by national legislation 
(b) is based on the national common voters roll; 
(c) provides for a minimum voting age of 18 years; and 
(d) results, in general, in proportional representation. 
Section 4 (2) adds that an Act of Parliament must provide a formula for determining the 
number of members of the National Assembly.  Similar provisions (Sections 105 (1) and (2)) 
apply to the composition and election of the Provincial legislatures. 
To inform their thinking, the ETT commissioned a nationally representative survey of 
public attitudes about the qualities of the current electoral system, and how it might be 
improved within the constraints of the constitution.  It was conducted by four prominent South 
African research survey companies (ACNielsen, MarkData, Markinor, and Research Surveys) 
and coordinated and analysed by the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC). 
 
 
1. Framework and Methodology of the Survey1 
 
The specific objectives of the survey were to obtain information from amongst the pool of 
potentially qualified voters concerning levels of political awareness and participation, 
knowledge of the political system, sources of information on politics and government, 
previous and potential voting behaviour, attitudes toward the current electoral system and 
preferred values to be achieved by an electoral system.  A recommended questionnaire was 
designed for the ETT by the HSRC, containing both structured and semi-structured questions.  
The ETT made final decisions about which question items were included in the final version. 
 The questionnaire was administered face to face to a random, nationally 
representative sample of 2,760 South African citizens of voting age, between the period 16 
July and 16 August 2002.  This included 60 pilot interviews to test the length of the interview 
and the formulation of the questions.  
The HSRC designed the sample of the target population with the sampling population 
defined as all people living in households and hostels (but excluding special institutions such 
as prisons and hospitals) who could be contacted and interviewed.  A list of all Enumerator 
Areas (EAs) based on the 1996 census was used as a sampling frame.  The list contained 
descriptive data on the number of people and number of households for each EA in the 
country. 
The final sample was a random, disproportionate, multi-stage, stratified, cluster 
sample.  The list of EAs was stratified into nine provincial lists, and then into four population 
groups within each province, and further into rural and urban lists.  To obtain the required 
                                                 
1  Full details concerning the questionnaire and survey methodology can be obtained, on request, from the ETT, 
from the ETT Technical Report, Parts I, II and III. However, the Report does not acknowledge the important 
roles played by Craig Schwabe and Jacques Pietersen of the Surveys, Analysis, Mapping and Modelling 
programme of the HSRC in drawing the sample and undertaking the weighting of the data. The authors would 
like to record their deep gratitutude. 
 
sample of 2,760 individuals, 690 EAs were randomly selected from these lists with the 
probability of selection proportionate to population size.  Finally, an implicit stratification by 
home language was implicitly introduced through a method known as ‘controlled selection’.   
Within each of the selected EAs, four visiting points were randomly selected. At each 
visiting point, all eligible respondents were enumerated and one respondent was randomly 
selected.  No substitutions were allowed.  If the selected respondent was not at home at the 
time of the first visit (normally made after working hours), two follow-up visits were made at 
agreed times and dates.  Questionnaires were administered in the language of the 
interviewees’ choice, with appropriate use of show cards.  Interviewers reported that the 
questionnaire was formulated clearly and was user-friendly. 
This results in a sample that is representative because it is random and because each 
South African had an equal and known chance of being interviewed.  However, some 
exceptions were necessary to enhance the reliability of the analysis.  In the Northern Cape 
and amongst the three minority population groups (white, coloured and Indian respondents) 
strictly proportional selection would have resulted in insufficient numbers of respondents 
selected to support detailed analysis.  Thus, a disproportionate number of EAs was selected 
among these strata.  These cases, however, were subsequently weighted downward so that 
they would have the proper influence on the final national results.   
 
 
2. Attitudes Toward the Current Electoral System 
 
South Africa’s first two democratic, non-racial general elections (including elections for the 
nine provincial assemblies) held in 1994 and 1999 were conducted under a national list system 
of proportional representation (PR) with no minimum fixed proportion of the total number of 
votes, or threshold required for parties to gain representation in parliament or provincial 
assemblies.  The choice of this electoral system was an outcome of the negotiation process 
that produced the democratic settlement, and was dictated by the perceived 
characteristics of this form of PR.  Notably, it had the virtues of, firstly, being simple to use and 
to explain to voters.  Secondly, it provided for maximum representation thereby ensuring the 
inclusion rather than the exclusion of minority parties and opinions.  Thirdly, because it was 
inclusive, it was more likely than alternative electoral systems to encourage reconciliation and 
cooperation between the competing political parties, (a quality that was enhanced in the 
first parliament by a constitutional requirement requiring a government of national unity 
consisting of all parties winning a minimum number of seats).  Overall, the idea of 
proportionality was seen as vital to allay suspicions that the electoral system would unfairly 
favour one party over another (as notoriously has happened via the manipulation of the 
demarcation of constituency boundaries under the plurality systems used in South Africa prior 
to 1994, or can  happen under those still in use in the US, UK and most Commonwealth 
countries) (Robertson, 1994; Mattes, 1994; Sisk, 1995).   
If the mechanics of the national list PR system were intended to provide a system that 
was ‘fair’, then the political assumption on which that intention was based was that elections 
held under its rubric would also be ‘free’.  In the post-negotiation South African context this 
required that parties would encounter ‘a level playing field’ in the sense that no party would 
be favoured above others by the governmental or administrative machinery.  To this end the 
1994 and 1999 elections were run by the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC), established 
under the 1994 constitution and charged with administering elections in a politically neutral 
way.  
 
Fairness and Equality 
Given these imperatives driving the selection of the present electoral system, we begin by 
reporting results to a set of question items that gauge public opinion about these very aspects 
of the current system. Because people may have very different levels of knowledge about the 
existing system, the interviewer began this set of questions by informing respondents that: 
 
General elections are normally held every five years.  In these elections, 
people vote for a political party.  The top people from each party’s list of 
candidates then go into parliament or the provincial assembly according to 
how many votes each party receives.  Once parliament is elected, the 
Members of Parliament elect the President and the Members of Provincial 
Legislatures elect the Premiers. 
 
The survey then asked respondents a series of questions about their opinions of the current 
electoral system.  Looking across these questions, it is clear that a substantial majority feels 
that, overall, the present system is fair and treats parties and voters equally.2  Three quarters 
say they are ‘satisfied’ with ‘the way we elect our government’ (74 percent) and agree the 
system is ‘fair to all parties’ (72 percent).  Approximately two thirds feel that ‘all voters were 
treated equally’ in the 1999 election (68 percent) and that ‘all parties were treated equally’ in 
1999 (63 percent).  Thus, the voters agree with scholars who focus on PR’s ability to represent 
broad swathes of plural societies (Lijpart, 1994; Reynolds, 1999). 
 
Table 1. The fairness and equality of the present electoral system 




Are you satisfied with the way we elect our government in 
South Africa?  
74 5 21 
Is the voting system is fair to all parties? 72 11 17 
Do you think that all voters were treated equally in the 1999 
general election? 
68 14 18 
Do you think all parties were treated equally in the 1999 
general election? 
63 16 21 
 
Before we proceed further, we need to step back and think about the criteria we use 
to evaluate these and subsequent responses.  The typical analysis of public opinion looks 
carefully at issues of the balance of opinion, that is, at those options that are supported by a 
plurality or even a majority of respondents.  However, readers need to consider whether 
normal majority / plurality / minority considerations are adequate criteria to judge these 
results.  Should support for the fundamentals of the constitutional system (such as national 
identity, democracy, the Constitution itself, and the way we elect our representatives) enjoy a 
scope of legitimacy broader than a simple majority?  Do electoral systems require what 
political scientist David Easton once called ‘diffuse support’, meaning a type of support for 
government that is almost consensual and cuts across all societal cleavages (Easton, 1966)? 
 With these considerations in mind, these results taken together suggest that the system 
is far from ‘broke’ in the eyes of voters.  Accordingly caution ought to be exercised in 
‘mending it’.  However, against that, we note that fully one-fifth of respondents are dissatisfied 
with the present system, and that around one-third are either dissatisfied or non-committal in 
their judgment.  In other words, support for the current system is less than consensual and 
significantly-sized minorities are dissatisfied. 
 
Accountability 
There is a similar pattern of responses to a series of questions on the breadth of representation 
and degree of political accountability produced by the present system (Table 2).3  Four fifths 
of respondents feel that the system ‘ensures that we include many voices in parliament’ (81 
percent) and that the system gives voters a chance to ‘change the party in power’, (78 
                                                 
2  These question items are reported as a group, and separate from subsequent questions because statistical 
analyses known as factor analysis and reliability analysis verified that responses to them formed a valid and 
reliable factor that explained 63.7 percent of the common variance (Eigenvalue = 2.55) with a reliability score 
(Kronbach’s Alpha) of .80.  The item that most strongly defined the scale was equal treatment of all parties 
(factor loading of .82) and the weakest whether the system is fair to all parties (.58). 
  
3  Factor analysis and reliability analysis indicates that these items form a unique, valid and reliable factor that 
explains 44.7 percent of the common variance with a reliability score (Kronabach’s Alpha) of .75.  The item that 
most strongly defined the factor is whether the system holds all parties accountable (.68) and the weakest 
whether it enables voters to influence government (.43). 
 
percent).  Around seven in ten say the system enables voters to ‘influence parliament’ (71 
percent), that it produces ‘the best possible government’ (69 percent), and that it allows 
voters to hold political parties ‘accountable for their actions’ (68 percent).  However, we see 
a notable drop off in agreement when we ask whether the system helps voters ‘hold 
individual representatives of government accountable for their actions’: here, just 60 percent 
agree and fully one-quarter (25 percent disagree). 
 
Table 2. The electoral system and political accountability 
 Yes Neutral/Dk No 
Does the voting system ensure that we include many voices 
in parliament?  
81 8 11 
Does the voting system give voters a way to change the 
party in power? 
78 9 14 
Can voters influence parliament?  71 11 18 
Does the voting system give us the best possible 
government?  
69 9 22 
Does the voting system help voters hold the parties 
accountable for their actions? 
68 12 20 
Does the voting system help voters hold individual 
representatives of government accountable for their 
actions?  
60 15 25 
 
All of this suggests that voters recognise that the system produces a high level of 
representativeness and also believe that it allows them to turn the party in power out of office, 
if necessary.  In other words, while several commentators have categorised the African 
National Congress (ANC), which won 63 percent and 67 percent of the national vote in 1994 
and 1999 respectively as a ‘dominant’ party (Giliomee and Simkins, 1999; Giliomee et al, 
2001), voters do not necessarily view its position as unassailable.  In other words, most voters 
believe that the electoral system enables them to make their voices heard in the halls of 
parliament and ensure that political parties ‘anticipate’ their reactions at the next election to 
the actions they take today.4   
However, these results also suggest that many voters agree with those political 
scientists who argue that PR’s weakest area is that it does not allow the electorate to hold 
individual parliamentarians and government officials accountable (Barkan, 1995).  This is 
particularly notable in the context of the task that the ETT has been given; it must take into 
account the widespread argument that the national list PR system weakens the political 
accountability of individual members of legislatures by empowering party leaderships (who 
exert considerable influence in the construction of the parties’ lists of candidates for election).  
In contrast, so it is often said, constituency or geographic representation provides a more 
direct link between voters and their representatives, whilst simultaneously demanding of the 
latter a dual loyalty (to both their party and their constituents). We will address this question at 
greater length below.  On the whole, however, the results in Tables 1 and 2 display a relatively 
high level of satisfaction with the existing system. 
 
Explaining Popular Evaluations of the Electoral System 
In order to test which factors structure attitudes towards the current electoral system, the 
survey measured a range of basic demographic characteristics (e.g. age, race, home 
language, education, household type, employment, province and rural-urban status).  It also 
measured a series of attitudinal and behavioural factors such as respondents’ main source of 
political information, their political knowledge, political interest, and their political 
participation in previous elections and other forms of political activity.   
Statistical analysis revealed that, as in so many other areas of public opinion in South 
Africa, the most important demographic structuring characteristic is race.  For instance, if we 
re-visit the issue of satisfaction with the present electoral system, we find  that white, coloured 
and Indians respondents are considerably less satisfied than black voters with various aspects 
                                                 
4  The concept of “anticipated reactions” comes from Carl Friedrich, Constitutional Practice and Democracy. 
 
of the current system.  At the same time, readers should note that the overlap is far from 
complete.5  Between one third and one half of white voters, and just above one half to 60 
percent of coloured and Indian respondents offer positive assessments of the current system.  
It is also notable that between 12 to 15 percent of black respondents register dissatisfaction 
with the system.  Clearly, many other factors besides race shape the way voters think about 
the political world. 
What may be most significant for the ETT is the fact that there is greatest cross-racial 
agreement with the items that refer to the electoral system per se (i.e. ‘the way we elect our 
government’, ‘the voting system is fair’) than with the items that refer more to election 
administration (‘treatment’ of parties and voters).  Thus, although the overall objectives of the 
present electoral system would seem to earn relative approval across all racial groups, the 
mode of its implementation appears to be in considerably greater dispute.  Again, however, 
we refer readers to the issue of how much support is required for something such as an 
electoral system, and how widespread that support should be. 
 
Table 3. Fairness and equality of the present electoral system (by race) 
 Black White Coloured Indian 
Satisfied with way we elect our  
government  
81 51 56 64 
Voting system is fair  78 48 55 68 
Voters were treated equally in 1999  
general Elections 
75 37 55 57 
Parties were treated equally in  1999  
general elections  
70 34 46 52 
(Percentage agree) 
 
There are smaller racial differences in attitudes toward the degree of political 
accountability produced by the current system.6  There is broad cross racial agreement that 
the system allows people to influence parliament and produces as broadly representative a 
parliament as possible.  However, whites, in particular, are considerably less optimistic than 
other voters that the system enables people to hold individual representatives and political 
parties accountable or that it produces the best government possible.  Readers should note 
that the fairly widespread misgivings of the minority voters that the electoral system renders 
parties and individual politicians unaccountable is also shared by over a fifth of blacks.  As will 
be illustrated below, these queries about accountability are echoed in people’s thinking 
about the relative values of alternative electoral systems. 
 
Table 4. Political accountability of the electoral system  (by race) 
 Black White Coloured Indian 
The voting system ensures we include 
many voices in parliament 
83 70 77 82 
The voting system offers a way to 
change the party in power 
81 53 73 80 
The voting system gives us the best  
Possible government 
77 37 55 59 
The voting system holds parties  
Accountable 
73 43 61 66 
Voters can influence parliament 72 64 70 85 
The voting system holds representatives 
of government accountable 
64 38 57 64 
                                                 
5  Statistically, the correlation (Eta) of race and an index of satisfaction with the fairness of the current system is 
.43 which means that race statistically accounts for 18 percent of the variance in attitudes toward the electoral 
system.  Clearly there are many other things that affect how people think about politics than merely their racial 
categorization. 
 




 We use multiple regression analysis to examine the factors that shape how people 
view the electoral system, testing all relevant demographic, attitudinal, and behavioural 
factors measured in the survey.  Multiple regression is a tool that helps assess the correlation of 
a set of independent, or predictor variables on a dependent variable (in this case, attitudes 
toward the electoral system).  It enables us to determine how well the entire set of predictor 
variables correlates with the dependent variables.  It also identifies the correlation between a 
specific independent variable and the dependent variable controlling for the simultaneous 
correlation of that variable with all the other independent variables.   
Tables 5 and 6 display the most important standardised regression coefficients (all 
results are displayed in Appendices A and B): these coefficients take into account that the 
different factors are measured with different scales and summarise the relative impact of 
each factor on views of the electoral system.  We see that race still plays a very strong role.  
Even when we statistically control for the impact of differences in rural-urban status and 
educational status, white, coloured and Indian respondents are still considerably more 
negative in their assessments of the equality and fairness of the system than are blacks.  
Controlling for other factors, whites are significantly less positive about the political 
accountability of the system than all other voters.  Moreover, these differences remain even 
when we control for differences in respondents’ approval ratings of elected officials: this 
strongly suggests that racial differences in evaluations of electoral system are not simply a 
function of their disapproval of the party in government, the ANC.  With regard to the other 
important demographic determinants, more educated respondents are more likely to say 
that the system produces fair and equal results, and those who live in formal housing are less 
likely to say that it produces accountability.  Other demographic factors such as rural-urban 
distinctions and gender had no impact.   
 At the same time, readers should note that job approval ratings of elected officials 
themselves have a major impact on how people see the electoral system (they are the 
second strongest determinant after race of popular views of the system’s equality and 
fairness, and have the single strongest impact on assessments of its accountability).  In other 
words, controlling for all other factors, the more people approve of the way their elected 
leaders do their jobs, the more positive they are about the electoral system.  Since we know 
from other research that job approval ratings are heavily shaped by partisan factors, we 
interpret this to mean that views of the electoral system are also strongly shaped by partisan 
criteria (independently of the impact of race).  To support this interpretation, we also point to 
the fact that those respondents who identify with a political party are much more positive 
about both aspects of the current electoral system than other voters.  Based on the results of 
virtually all other research on this matter, we know that the large majority of these identifiers 
support the governing party, the ANC.7  Since the impact of partisanship remains even after 
we have statistically controlled for the impact of race, this means that the 57 percent of black 
respondents who identified with a party (predominantly, the ANC) are far more likely to 
approve of the existing system than the 43 percent who are politically ‘independent’.  That 
South Africans view the current electoral system through a thick partisan lens is something that 
the ETT needs to take seriously. 
 Finally, those respondents who are interested in politics have more positive 
assessments of both aspects of the current system than those who are not.  Interaction with 
the political system (in the sense of making contact with elected officials, party or community 
leaders) leads to more positive assessments of the system’s freeness and fairness, and those 
who have voted most often since 1994 are more likely to feel that the system produces 
accountability.  
 
                                                 
7  Unfortunately, we cannot test this interpretation directly since the ETT chose not to ask respondents which 
political party with which they identified.  
 
Table 5. Determinants of evaluations of the equality and fairness of the system 




Coloured  -.15*** 
Indian -.09*** 
Education .05* 
Political Attitudes  
Approves of Overall Performance of Elected Leaders .27*** 
Interested In Politics  .08*** 
Identifies With A Political Party .06** 
Political Behaviours  
Voting Participation Since 1994  .09*** 
Makes Contact With Leaders  .05* 
Adjusted R2 .38 
Dependent Variable: Index of Perceived Equality and Fairness of Current Electoral System 
Table displays all variables with a Beta weight equal of greater than .05 
* = Significant at .05,  ** = significant at .01; *** = significant at .001. 
 
 
Table 6. Determinants of evaluations of the accountability of the electoral system 
Standardised Coefficients 
(Beta) 
Political Attitudes  
Approves of Overall Job Performance of Elected Officials  .27*** 
Identifies With A Political Party .11*** 
Interested In Politics  .09*** 
Demographic Factors  
White -.25*** 
Lives in Area With Formal Housing -.07** 
Political Behaviours  
Voting Participation Since 1994  .08*** 
Adjusted R2 .28 
Dependent Variable: Index of Perceived Accountability of Current Electoral System 
Table displays all variables with a Beta weight . .05 
* = Significant at .05; ** = significant at .01; *** = significant at .001. 
 
 
3. What Do South Africans Want Out of an Electoral System? 
 
The broadly positive popular views of the current voting system mean that there is little 
pressure for a radical move to a fundamentally different type of system.  But can we 
conclude that the voters see no need for any reform?  Recall that we have already seen that 
political support for the existing system is far from consensual.  Significant pockets of negative 
and pessimistic opinions exist, located disproportionately (though clearly not wholly) amongst 
racial minorities.  Negative opinion is also concentrated amongst the sizable proportions of 
black respondents who are dissatisfied with the performance of elected officials, who do not 
identify with a political party, and who are less engaged with the political process (cognitively 
or behaviourally).  
Moreover, when we ask voters about the sorts of thing that they want a voting system 
to produce, large proportions and even majorities emphasise features that South Africa’s 
model of pure proportional representation has great difficulty producing.  These things, in 
order of preference: are a direct connection between local areas and legislators; greater 
grass roots control over legislators; a directly elected President; greater freedom for legislators 
to criticise their own political parties and take stances on legislation independent of the party 
line; and the potential for independent candidates.  At the same time, when posed the 
choice, most respondents want a parliament that is as broadly representative as possible, 
even at the risk of slowing the legislative process.  They also want parties to nominate more 
women, and indeed favour requiring them to do so.  This section will review these results in 
detail.   
The ETT and the survey designers were conscious from the start that levels of public 
knowledge about competing electoral systems were likely to be scant at best.  Thus, the 
survey took an alternative route and attempted to get at the kinds of broad values that 
people felt should be maximised in an ideal voting system.  Two types of questions were used 
to establish these preferences.  First of all, respondents were asked an open-ended question 
to tap what voting meant to them.  Secondly, respondents were given a range of paired 
statements intended to get them to express preferences on prominent dimensions of electoral 
choice often identified by analysts of electoral systems.  
 
The Meaning of Voting 
We turn first to the question of what voting means to South Africans.  The responses reveal at 
least three important lessons (see Table 7).  First of all, South Africans exhibit a high degree of 
literacy on the subject.  Just 6 percent are unable to articulate any meaning of voting.  This 
echoes the high turnout rates in the first two democratic general elections.8  It could reflect at 
least two different factors.  Firstly, the goal of ‘one man, one vote’ was the overarching theme 
of the entire liberation movement.  Secondly, international donors, local and international 
NGOs and the South African Independent Electoral Commission have poured large amounts 
of resource and efforts into voter education since 1993.  The evidence seems to support the 
second option.  In testimony to the broad-based reach of voter education, educated 
respondents are no more likely to offer some understanding of voting than less-educated.9  
The most important demographic difference appears to be age: older voters are significantly 
more likely to say they ‘don’t know’ when asked what voting means.10 
Secondly, there is little sign of cynicism about the act of voting.  Just 4 percent gave 
comments that could be described as indifferent or negative views toward voting.  Most of 
these people told interviewers that voting made no difference.  But the important point is that 
this opinion is held at the moment by an extremely small percentage of eligible voters.  Thus, 
whatever the differences among South Africans about the efficacy of the present electoral 
system, there is widespread agreement that the act of voting – universally acknowledged as 
perhaps the key characteristic of democracy – is important.   
Thirdly, voters infuse voting with a variety of meanings, many of which can apparently 
be held simultaneously.  Three specific cognitions of voting were mentioned most frequently.  
It is important to remember that respondents were allowed to offer more than one response.  
Their responses were written down verbatim and coded into broader categories after the 
fact.  The most frequently mentioned meaning was to see voting in procedural terms, as a 
way to select representatives and government officials or leaders (mentioned by 42 percent 
of all respondents).  Mentioned just as frequently, and often by the same people who offered 
a procedural understanding, 42 percent of all respondents attribute a substantive, or 
instrumental purpose to voting: that is, they see it as a tool for securing material improvement 
in living conditions, many of whom paraphrase the ANC campaign slogan and say that 
voting brings ‘a better life’.  Thirdly, one quarter (26 percent of all respondents) say voting has 
                                                 
8  Turnout in 1994 was estimated at 87 percent of all eligible voters (there was no voters’ list).  In 1999, 89 
percent of some 18.2 million registered voters went to the polls.  The overall turnout rate, however, differed 
depending on whether one used the IEC’s estimate that 81 percent of all eligible voters had registered (which 
puts turnout at 72 percent) or survey based estimates of 76 percent (which puts actual turnout at 68 percent of all 
eligible voters).  Whichever figure is used, the 1999 registration figure compares unfavourably with most 
established democracies, except the United States.  However the actual turnout figure compares favourably to 
second-generation elections in the rest of Africa but also to elections in established democracies in the West..  
See Andrew Reynolds, “The Results”, in his edited Election ’99 South Africa: From Mandela to Mbeki. James 
Currey; London. David Philip; Cape Town. St. Martin’s Press; New York. 
 
9  Pearson’s r = .03, significance = .156. 
 
10  Pearson’s r = .13, significance = .000. 
 
an important symbolic purpose: that is, to vote is an act of participating in a democracy and 
an expression of citizenship and responsibility to society.11  Finally, some 10 percent see voting 
as an act of identification with a party or person they admire, a figure that is surprisingly low 
given that 52 percent of respondents claimed that they felt close to a political party.  This may 
suggest that South Africans’ partisan identification is potentially more fluid than is often 
assumed. 
With a few exceptions, responses show few important variations according to race.  
White (37 percent), coloured (40 percent) and Indian respondents (37 percent) are more 
likely to see democracy in symbolic terms than black are respondents (21 percent).  Coloured 
respondents are far less likely to see democracy in procedural terms (22 percent) than all 
others.  White respondents are far less likely to see democracy in substantive terms (14 
percent) than all others.   
 
Table 7.  The Meaning of voting 
 Percent 
Voting is about electing representatives 
  Voting is about electing persons, leaders, the President 
  Voting is about electing someone who will consider our needs and rights 
  Voting is about choosing the right person or party 







Voting allows transmission of needs and demands 
  Voting is about getting the things we want or need 
  Voting is about getting help to obtain pensions, electricity, water, housing  
  Voting is about getting help to get employment 
  Voting is about securing a better life 














Voting symbolises citizenship 
  To vote is to vote for our country 
  Voting is about being involved in society, being involved in South Africa, 
   its about taking part 
  Voting is about making a difference, contributing to society 
  Voting is about being heard 
  Voting is about getting equality / equal treatment for everybody   
  Voting is about exercising our democratic rights, fighting for our needs 












Voting allows identification with charisma 







Voting does not make a difference 
  It makes no difference if you vote or not, voting is a waste of time 








Can you describe what it means to you to vote? 
 
But while the overwhelming majority of South Africans attach major significance to 
voting and signal their intent to participate in the next general election, this does not 
                                                 
11  This meaning accords with the view of South African elections offered by Steven Friedman, “Who we are: 
voter participation, rationality and the 1999 election”, Politikon, 26, 2, 1999: 213-24. 
 
necessarily mean that they all want the same outcomes from an electoral system.  In order to 
tap the things people want a voting system to do, we offered respondents a range of paired 
statements.  As mentioned previously, the goal was to get people to express preferences on 
prominent dimensions of electoral system choice that have been identified by analysts of 
electoral systems.  We can group responses to these questions into four major dimensions.  First 
of all, a set of questions measured people’s positions on the relative importance of individual 
candidates versus political parties.  Secondly, a set of items examined where South Africans 
stand on the issue of localised versus centralised control of political parties.  Thirdly, a set of 
questions assessed where respondents place themselves on the issue of individual autonomy 
versus internal discipline in political parties.  A fourth set of questions measured people’s 
peoples’ preferences on the issue of efficiency versus representation in the legislature.  Finally, 
one question item asked people about their preferences for presidential election. We will 
detail the precise way in which each of these issues, or dimensions is connected to the choice 
of electoral systems below.   
 
Individual Candidates Versus Political Parties 
Different voting systems can present very different ‘packages’ of choices to voters at election 
time.  These range from, at one extreme, only political parties and their competing policy 
platforms (for example, South Africa), to a mixture of party platforms as well as individual 
candidates (Germany), to a more candidate-centered system in which party policies play 
some role (the United States), to the other extreme consisting purely of independent 
candidates where party affiliation is totally removed (Uganda’s no-party system as well as 
non-partisan elections in several American states). 
While the space limitations of the survey did not allow us to tap each and every 
aspect of these dimensions, the questions that were asked allow us to assess broadly what 
type of outcome South Africans want their electoral system to produce.  The evidence 
suggests that people want a system that revolves around political parties, though many voters 
want a system that has a space for independent candidates.  More than two thirds (70 
percent) say they prefer to vote for a party candidate rather than an individual.  At the same 
time, four in ten (42 percent) say they would like to see independent candidates elected to 
Parliament in 2004, and one third (35 percent) say they would personally consider voting for 
one.  
 
Table 8. Individual candidates versus political parties 
 Yes Don’t 
know 
No 
In the next election would you like to see independent 
candidates, that is, candidates who do not belong to any 
political party, elected to parliament?  
42 12 46 
Would you consider voting for a candidate who does not 
belong to any specific political party, that is, an independent 
candidate, at the next election? 
35 10 56 
Do you prefer to vote for an individual, or do you prefer to 
vote for a political party? 
28 2 70 
 
Indian respondents are marginally more likely to support the inclusion of independent 
candidates.  White voters are particularly likely to prefer voting for an individual personality 
rather than a political party.  While black respondents are the most enthusiastic adherents of 
political parties, it may surprise some to see that as many as a quarter of the latter would be 
prepared to vote for an individual over a party.  Other than these, there is little difference 
between voters of different racial groups.   
 
Table 9. Individual candidates versus political parties by race 
 Black White Coloured Indian 
Want to see independent candidates 
elected to parliament  
41 45 39 52 
Would consider voting for an independent 
candidate at the next election?  
33 42 37 47 
Prefers to vote for an individual (rather than 
a political party) 
26 40 26 37 
(Percentage agree) 
 
Localised Versus Centralised Control of Political Parties 
Different combinations of voting systems and other constitutional arrangements may produce 
very different environments for political parties.  For instance, a strong separation of powers 
between the American President and Congress mixed with a first-past-the-post constituency 
system works to limit executive control over legislators of the same political party.  Moreover, 
the mixture of strong federalism and state control of election machinery works to weaken 
severely national party control over state and local parties in the United States.  Party 
candidates are chosen in primary elections by members of that party.  South Africa may lie at 
the other end of this continuum.  Here the combination of a parliamentary system, very weak 
federalism, and pure proportional representation (plus the ability of party leaders to expel 
their own legislators from parliament) produces very high degrees of centralised control.  
Candidate lists are generated by party branches, but central party committees exercise a 
strong degree of control over its final composition.  Somewhere in the middle, various 
combinations of electoral rules and political institutions may produce legislators who must 
support the executive or risk bringing down the government, but have the strength to 
challenge party leadership in party caucuses.  Other combinations of rules enable greater 
decentralised autonomy by allowing for governments to continue even when they lose 
legislative votes so long as no other party or parties can command greater support.  
What type of outcome would South Africans like their electoral system to produce?  
The evidence suggests that people want a system that enables them to select their legislators 
and legislative candidates more directly, and have more direct access to legislators so they 
can better represent their interests and opinions.   
First of all, close to three quarters (71 percent) say they want to vote for a candidate 
from the area in which they live; one quarter said they did not (27 percent).  A follow-up, 
open-ended question then asked people ‘Why do you feel this way?’  Again, people could 
offer up to three reasons.  Interviewers recorded verbatim their responses that were grouped 
in categories for analysis after the fact.  The most frequently cited types of answer had to do 
with the belief that local candidates would better represent people’s opinions and interests; 
43 percent of respondents offered this type of response (see Table 11 for specific types of 
comments).  The second most frequent set of replies (23 percent) were related to the first, but 
focused on the issues of proximity, familiarity and trust.  Issues of constituency service were the 
third most frequently cited (22 percent).  Most of those who had indicated they did not vote 
for a local candidate either felt that the issue of local versus non-local candidates did not 
really matter, or were skeptical of the motives or abilities of anyone from their own area. 
 
Table 10. Localised versus centralised control of political parties 
 Yes Don’t 
know 
No 
Do you want to vote for a candidate from the area where 
you live? 
71 1 27 
 
Table 11. Reasons Why People Want / Don’t Want Local Candidates 
 Percent  
Prefer Local Candidates   
Better Representation  42 
Person will know what we want / will understand our needs / is familiar 34  
Person will represent us in parliament  6  
Other familiarity comments  2  
Proximity / Familiarity  23 
Person will be close enough to contact  15  
We know / trust / are familiar with them  7  
Help your own people / people you know  1  
Better Constituency Service  22 
Person will satisfy our needs / help us / look after us  14  
Person will help us with water, roads, employment, housing etc. 8  
Other  5 
Prefer someone from my own area  5  
   
Prefers Outside Candidates  18 
No one in our area is suitable / capable / qualified  6  
Person is only after personal gain / will only look after himself and his family’s 
needs / don’t care for us  
6  
Person will forget us after the elections 3  
Outsider will be fair / work harder / be honest / make a difference  2  
Other prefer outsider comments  1  
   
Does Not Matter  9 
It makes no difference who you vote for - there is no change  3  
As long as the work is done  2  
Other indifference comments  2  
As long as the person has necessary skills / leadership  1  
It makes no difference whether you vote or not  1  
   
Other   
Other miscellaneous comments  2  
   
Don’t Know  3 
Don’ Know  / Cant explain  2  
No reason  / nothing 1  
 
Two thirds (64 percent) agree with the statement that members of Parliament should 
‘live close to the people they represent’ so they can ‘express their opinions and promote their 
interests’, (although one third (32 percent) agreed that ‘It does not matter’ where MPs live in 
order for them to represent voters).  Finally, a majority (53 percent) agree that all party 
candidates should ‘be chosen by members of that party’ before the final election rather than 
by party leaders, something which can be accomplished in party caucuses or more inclusive 
direct primary elections.  
At the same time, it should be noted that respondents’ enthusiasm for local control of 
national or provincial legislators is not fully matched by their assessments of their new ward 
representatives to local government councillors.  The reformed local government system, as 
put into practice in the Local Government Elections of 2000, has established a mixed system 
composed of both types of councillor.  While just 38 percent said that ward councillors 
represented them best, this figure was almost twice that who said the party list councillors 
were the best representatives (20 percent).  One quarter (24 percent) saw no difference, and 
a final 17 percent did not know.  
 
Table 12. Localised versus centralised control of political parties 
Localised Agree Don’t 
Know 
Agree Centralised
Members of Parliament need to 
live close to the people they 
represent in order for them to 
express their opinions and 
promote their interests. 
64 4 32 It does not matter where 
Members of Parliament live 
for them to do a good job in 
representing the voters.
All political party candidates for 
Parliament should be chosen by 
members of that party before 
they stand for election. 
53 8 39 The leaders of political 
parties should choose their 
candidates as they know 
which people will be good 
representatives.
Which of these statements do you agree with most? 
 
Again, the racial profiles on this issue are remarkably similar.  On the open question 
about why people prefer local candidates, there were few statistically significant, and no 
important racial differences in the propensity to cite reasons of representation or proximity / 
familiarity.  Black and coloured respondents (23 percent of each) are about twice as likely to 
cite constituency service than are white or Indians (13 and 14 percent respectively); but the 
point is that this is a minority viewpoint among all groups. While Indian (24 percent) and black 
respondents (19 percent) are more likely to distrust the motives or capabilities of local 
candidates than coloured (15 percent) or white respondents (7 percent), the point again is 
that this is a minority sentiment in all communities.  Large majorities of black, white and 
coloured respondents want to vote for a local candidate.  Contrary to what some might 
expect, black respondents are most likely to agree that candidates should be selected by 
grass roots membership rather than party leaders, and that MPs need to live close to those 
they represent. 
 
Table 13.  Localised versus centralised control of political parties (by race) 
 Black White Coloured Indian 
Wants to vote for candidate from area in 
which they live 
71 73 75 61 
MPs need to live close to the people to express 
their opinions and promote their interests 
66 60 59 60 
All party candidates should be chosen by 
party members before they stand for election  
54 51 48 46 
 
Individual Autonomy Versus Internal Party Discipline 
The same types of consideration discussed in the previous section also conspire to produce 
very different capabilities for party leaders to impose programmatic consistency onto their 
members.  Systems differ considerably in the autonomy they create for elected legislators, 
particularly with regard to whether voters directly elect candidates or whether they only vote 
for candidate lists prepared by political parties.  Of course, in practice there are multiple ways 
in which constituency and list systems can be mixed, but the clear tendency is that individual 
legislators are more likely to exercise autonomy if they are subject to simultaneous pressures 
from their constituents (from below) and from the party leadership (from above).  In contrast, 
candidates elected simply from a party list tend to be cut off from the voters between 
elections and hence are subject only to the direct pressure from above by the party leader.  
Because the party, rather than the individual ‘owns’ the legislative seat, party leaders also are 
able to move legislators in and out of the legislature at will.   
The next set of questions address the degree of individual autonomy versus loyalty to 
the party South Africans want an electoral system to produce.  The results suggest that they 
believe that an electoral system should work to produce an environment in which the voters, 
rather than party leaders, elect and remove legislative representatives.  While respondents 
are more divided, the balance of opinion believes legislators should be able to criticise their 
party or oppose the party line when voting on legislation.   
Fifty four percent agree that elected officials should serve out their terms, as opposed 
to 38 percent who agree that party leaders should have the right to redeploy elected 
members to other jobs outside Parliament.   A majority (51 percent) agree that elected 
representatives should have freedom of expression to criticise their own parties, while 44 
percent say that legislators owe their loyalty to their political party.  Forty seven percent say 
that MPs should be able to vote according to their own beliefs, while 44 percent say they 
should always vote according to the party line.   
 
Table 14.  Individual autonomy versus internal party discipline 
Autonomy of the MP Agree Don’t 
Know 
Agree Party Discipline
Once a person is elected to 
parliament, they should stay 
there until the next election  
54 8 38 The party leadership should 
have the right to deploy 
Members of Parliament to 
another job outside Parliament
Members of Parliament 
(MPs) should be able to 
criticise their own political 
party  
51 5 44 MPs should always be loyal to 
their party leaders because 
they were elected on their 
party’s platform
Members of Parliament 
should vote according to 
their own beliefs  
47 5 44 Members of Parliament should 
always vote the way their party 
decides
Which of these statements do you agree with most? 
 
Again, these sentiments are spread fairly evenly across the racial groups.  Black 
respondents are slightly more likely to favour the ‘party’ and whites slightly more likely to 
favour individual autonomy. However, what is probably the most significant finding, because 
of their demographic majority amongst the electorate, is that 53 percent of black 
respondents want legislators to have a secure seat that cannot be changed by party leaders 
and that nearly 50 percent want legislators to be able to exercise their own judgment 
independently of their party.   
 
Table 15.  Individual autonomy versus internal party discipline (by race) 
 Black White Coloured Indian 
Once elected, MPs should stay in parliament until next 
election 
53 59 55 49 
MPs should be able to criticise their own party  49 61 50 38 
MPs should vote according to their own beliefs  45 61 58 58 
 
 
Representation Versus Legislative Efficiency 
Pure proportional representation systems with low vote thresholds (such as South Africa’s) tend 
to produce large numbers of small political parties with legislative seats, and may complicate 
the organisation and operation of a legislature.  Many of these concerns can be minimised if 
PR produces a tightly-disciplined majority party.  However, if there is no singly majority party, 
more time and effort will be required to bargain over the allocation of committee seats, 
question time and speaking time, and to the extent that their consent is required, slow the 
legislative process.  On the other end of the spectrum, purely constituency-based systems 
with single member districts tend to produce two party systems and artificially strong 
legislative majorities(Mackenzie, 1958).  While this may exclude many voices, scholars argue 
that it produces efficient and ‘responsible’ government by reducing the need for bargaining 
and compromise (APSA, 1950.).   
Representation and efficiency are both qualities which are extremely important to the 
health of any democracy, yet there is clearly a tension between them (as is demonstrated, for 
instance, by the existence of the ‘guillotine’ in various parliaments whereby governments are 
able to limit the length of debate on particular issues and thereby to prevent filibustering).  
Where do South Africans situate themselves on this question?   
When posed with a choice between these two poles, most South Africans come down 
on the end of broad representation.  Six of ten (59 percent) say that the most important 
purpose of parliament is to represent all parts of society, even if it requires more time for 
debate; one third (34 percent) feel that too many voices will paralyse the process, thus 
necessitating a strong majority.  A similar 59 percent say that parliament should contain as 
many political parties as necessary, while a third (35 percent) agree that too many parties 
may make Parliament unmanageable.   
 








The most important thing is for 
Parliament to represent all 
parts of society, even if it 
takes longer to debate and 
make decisions  
59 7 34 A Parliament that represents 
too many opinions will not be 
able to make decisions easily, 
so it is important to have a 
party with a strong majority 
that can pass laws and get 
things done
Parliament should be able to 
represent as many parties as 
possible  
59 7 35 Too many parties may make 
Parliament unmanageable
Which of these statements do you agree with most? 
 
Yet again, opinion on these issues is relatively evenly spread across the racial groups.  
If there is any significant nuance it would appear to be that – perhaps in contrast to their 
relatively stronger support for independent candidates and the autonomy of MPs – white 
respondents give higher priority to legislative efficiency than other voters.   
 
Table 17. Representation versus efficiency in legislatures (by race) 
 Black White Coloured Indian 
Parliament should represent all parts of society, even if 
takes longer to take decisions  
60 56 59 61 
Parliament should represent as many parties as possible 61 49 54 57 
 
 
Direct Election of the President 
One question item simply asked people whether or not they would like to vote for the 
President directly.  At present, South Africa’s President is first elected to parliament on a party 
list before being elected by Parliament.  In contrast to this practice, 63 percent of the public 
want the President to be directly elected by the voters, not by Parliament.  Of those who 
wanted a direct vote, the survey then asked whether they wanted the President to be 
elected at the same time as Parliament: 85 percent said yes. 
 
Table 18. Direct election of the president 
 Yes  No Don’t 
know 
At present, the President is elected by Parliament.  Would you like 
to vote for the President directly? 
63 28 9 
If Yes, would you like to vote for the President at the same time 
that you vote for Parliament? 
85 12 2 
 
Yet again, the racial profile on this issue is remarkably similar: direct election of the 
President is a majority preference amongst every group of voters.  
 
Table 19. Direct election of the president (by race) 
 Black White Coloured Indian 
Would like to vote for the President directly  63 64 58 63 
 
At the same time, it should be noted that the survey did not ask respondents whether 
they wanted to strengthen the Presidency relative to either parliament or his / her political 
party (a likely outcome of such a significant constitutional change).  Given respondents’ fairly 
strongly expressed views in favour of the relative autonomy of MPs and their support for local 
candidates, it could be that they would be cautious about any move that might weaken the 
legislature relative to the executive.  On the other hand, they might reckon that a stronger 
President relative to Parliament might represent a shift in favour of stronger checks and 




Finally, the survey posed two issues about women’s representation in parliament.  The South 
African parliament is now justly famous for having one of the highest proportions of women 
legislators in the world (30 percent).12  Our respondents were not reminded of this 
achievement, nor were they given any information concerning the number of women in 
either parliament or the individual provincial legislatures.  However, when asked to consider 
whether the existing gender balance in parliament was sufficient, 43 percent felt that there 
were still ‘too few’ women in parliament, while one quarter (28 percent) felt the number was 
sufficient; 11 percent said there were ‘too many’.  Another 18 percent said they did not know.  
We then asked people whether parties should be required to nominate more women as 
candidates, to which 63 percent responded that they should.   
 







Think about the number of women in parliament. Do 
you think that too few, sufficient or too many women 
get elected. 
11 28 43 18 
 
Table 21. Should parties be required to nominate more women? 
 Yes No Don’t 
know 
Do you think that the political parties should be required to 
nominate more women for election?  
63 26 10 
 
 
These views are consistent with the broader desire that South Africa’s legislatures 
should be as broadly representative as possible.  However, in other ways, these views might 
be seen to conflict with respondents’ desire for local candidates and localised control over 
candidate selection.  This is because the reason the South African parliament has been able 
to achieve such a relatively high proportion of women is because political parties have 
chosen consciously to nominate women to their party lists (with the ANC, for instance, having 
adopted the rule that one-third of its candidates’ lists must be composed of women).  The list 
system has also enabled parties to manipulate the entire demographic profile of the 
candidates they offer for election, so that, for instance, apart from ensuring a given 
proportion of women, they can also ensure (if they so desire) a given proportion of other 
demographic majorities (notably white, coloured or Indian candidates).  In contrast, parties 
are far less able to influence the demographic profiles of their candidates in straightforward 
                                                 
12  Only Norway, Sweden, Iceland, the Netherlands, Denmark, Germany, New Zealand and Mozambique record 
higher levels of membership of women in their lower houses of parliament. See United Nations Development 
Programme, Human Development Report 2002: Deepening Democracy in a Fragmented World. Oxford 
University Press. New York. 2002. ‘Women’s Political Participation’, p.239-242. 
 
constituency systems, simply because constituency parties tend to insist on making their own 
choice of candidate.  Electoral systems that mix constituency and list representation, on the 
other hand, may be able to meet the voters’ desire to select and control their own legislators 
with their desire to ensure that parties nominate more women.   
 
4. The Democratic Consequences of Attitudes Towards the 
Electoral System 
 
Now that we have described the extent and distribution of positive public assessments of the 
current voting system, and preferences about the values that they want from an ideal system, 
the last obvious question is the extent to which any of this matters?  In other words, are people 
who have more negative views about the current system any more or less likely to have 
positive views of the democratic process, or to take part in it?  In this section, we examine the 
linkages of public views of the electoral system to three key democratic outcomes measured 
in the survey.  Do people feel that elections matter?  Do they think that representative 
institutions are concerned with public opinion?  And, finally, are they willing to vote in future 
elections?   
Let us begin by examining the actual responses to these questions.  Two thirds (67 
percent) see elections as important and agree with the statement that ‘it is important who is 
in power because it can make a difference to our lives’.  In contrast, three in ten (29 percent) 
feel that ‘It doesn’t really matter who is in power, because in the end things go on much the 
same’.  
 
Table 22. Importance of elections 





It is important who is in 
power because it can make 
a difference to our lives 
67 4 29 It doesn’t really matter who is in 
power, because in the end things 
go on much the same. 
Which of the following statements do you agree with most?  
 
When it comes to likely future voting behaviour, eight in ten South Africans say they 
want to vote in 2004 (33 percent) or want to do so very much (49 percent). 
 
Table 23. Desire to vote in 2004 
 Percent 
I definitely do not want to vote. 8 
I do not really want to vote 5 
I do not know 5 
I want to vote 33 
I definitely want to vote 49 
How much do you want to vote in the next general election in 2004? 
 
Yet people are far less sanguine about the performance of the representatives and 
representative institutions produced by those very elections.  This is a matter we shall return to 
at the end of this report.  But for now, we note that less than one in five believe that MPs ‘try 
their best to look after the interests of people like you’ (19 percent) or ‘to listen to what people 
like you have to say’ (19 percent).  We find almost the exact same responses when the two 
questions are asked about elected members of provincial government.13    
                                                 
13  While technically inconsistent with the questions about (national) parliamentarians, we used the term 
“members of provincial government” rather than “provincial assemblies” because pilot tests indicated 
many people were not familiar with the term “provincial assembly.” 
 
 
Table 24. Responsiveness of national and provincial legislators 






To look after the interests of people 
like you? (Parliament) 
5 14 38 36 6 
To listen to what people like you have 
to say? (Parliament) 
5 14 37 38 6 
To look after the interests of people 
like you? (Provincial Assembly) 
5 14 36 38 6 
To listen to what people like you have 
to say? (Provincial Assembly) 
5 14 36 39 6 
How often do you think elected representatives in Parliament / Provincial Government try their 
best? 
 
 To what extent do these key democratic predispositions and evaluations depend on 
their views of the voting system?  First of all, we find little support for the proposition that South 
Africans base their assessments of the efficacy of democratic elections on their views of the 
current electoral system.  We regressed perceptions of democratic efficacy on the full range 
of demographic, attitudinal and behavioural measures already used in Tables 5 and 6, 
including assessments of the freeness and fairness, and political accountability of the current 
system.  The results show that these variables collectively account for only 3 percent of the 
variance.  Obviously, whether or not people think democratic elections matter, has little to do 
with how they evaluate the current system.   
However, we see much stronger linkages between views of the current system and 
whether or not people believe provincial and national legislators are responsive to public 
opinion (Table 25, full results in Appendix C).  In fact, whether or not people believe the 
current system produces equal and fair outcomes, or whether it produces political 
accountability, are the two most important determinants of perceptions of responsiveness.  
Other key predictors include the rate at which people have participated in elections since 
1994, the rate with which they participate in politics between elections, and one’s interest in 
politics.  Significantly, there are no notable demographic predictors, such as race, age, 
education or gender.  Thus, if one wants to improve the public’s poor images of their public 
representatives, a good way to do it would be to improve voters’ perceptions of the system 
by which they are elected and re-elected. 
 
Table 25. Determinants of perceived responsiveness of legislators 
 Standardised Coefficients 
Beta 
Attitudes Toward Current System   
Believes current electoral system produces equality and 
fairness  
.19*** 
Believes current electoral system produces political 
accountability  
.16*** 
Political Behaviours  
Record of voting participation since 1994  .06** 
Participates in Political activity between elections .05* 
Other Political Attidudes  
Interested in politics  .05* 
Adjusted R2 .15 
Dependent Variable: Index of Perceived Responsiveness of Elected Legislators  
Table displays all variables with a Beta weight equal of greater than .05 
* = Significant at .05; ** = significant at .01; *** = significant at .001. 
 
Finally, we also find important linkages between views of the current system and future 
voting behaviour (Table 26, full results in Appendix D).  While one’s past voting record since 
1994 is the most accurate predictor of likely future voting, assessments of the electoral system 
exercise an independent impact.  Interest in politics and identification with a political party 
also turn out to be significant predictors of future voting.  
 
Table 26. Determinants of Likely Voting Turnout in 2004  
  Standardised Coefficients 
(Beta) 
Political Behaviours  
Record of voting participation since 1994  .25*** 
Attitudes Toward Current System   
Believes current electoral system produces equal and fair 
outcomes  
.14*** 
Believes current electoral system produces political 
accountability  
.10*** 
Other Political Attitudes  
Interested in Politics  .13*** 
Identifies with a political party  .07** 
Adjusted R2 .20 
Dependent Variable: Desire to Vote in 2004 Election  
Table displays all variables with a Beta weight equal of greater than .05 
* = Significant at .05; ** = significant at .01; *** = significant at .001. 
 
What does all this mean?  Quite simply, the current system’s public image matters.  This 
brings us back to the question we set out early in this paper.  While strong majorities believed 
the current voting system produces fair and equal outcomes, and produces political 
accountability, we also noted that significant minorities disagreed with these assessments and 
asked whether key fixtures of the democratic system should not enjoy broader and higher 
levels of public support.  Tables 25 and 26 may produce part of the answer.  What they 
demonstrate is that those sizable minorities who offered negative assessments of the system 
are indeed more likely to believe that the representatives elected through that system do not 
care about their opinions or interests, and are also less likely to come out and vote in 2004. 
 Those interested in improving public images of the electoral system would do well to 
look to the several values outlined in Section III of this report that are emphasised by large 





Two main sets of findings seem to be most pertinent to the ETT’s task.  First, South Africans 
recognise the significant achievements of the current system of proportional representation in 
producing fair results and treating voters and parties equally, as well as producing legislatures 
that are broadly representative of the population in both demographic and political terms.  
Thus there is little demand for a radical shift away from proportional representation.  There is 
only minority preference for the type of candidate centered, weak party system that a first-
past-the-post system can encourage (as in the United States).  Indeed, for the most part, 
people are happy with the present system. 
If South Africans are generally satisfied with what they have, does this mean that the 
ETT should say simply: ‘If it ain’t broke, don’t fix it’?  We feel the evidence provided by the 
survey answers in the negative.  First of all, public satisfaction with the current system is not 
consensual or widespread.  Significantly higher proportions are dissatisfied than one would 
prefer given that a voting system is an integral part of the overall constitutional framework.  
We have also shown that those people who are dissatisfied with the system are more likely to 
believe their legislators do not care about their opinion and interests, and are more likely to 
opt out of the process in the future.   
Secondly, while South Africans appreciate that the existing system produces 
proportionality, inclusiveness and fairness, they also emphasise other values that a pure list-
based version of proportional representation has difficulty producing: values such as 
independent-minded legislators accountable to local grass roots opinion.  
Finally, far from saying ‘it ain’t broke’, other survey results suggest strongly that the 
system is ‘broke’ in at least one very important way.  As we have already reported, this survey 
finds that only one in five voters feel that their national or provincial legislators are interested in 
listening to their opinions or looking after their interests.  Left unchecked, such views threaten 
to turn into a cancer in the body politic that slowly eats away at public confidence in 
democratic institutions. 
While Parliament has tried to address the issues of constituency representation and 
constituency service by assigning putative constituencies to MPs, the results have been 
dismal.  An Afrobarometer survey in July-August 2000 found that just two percent could even 
hazard a guess as to the name of their assigned member of parliament.  In contrast, 84 
percent of Malawians, 73 percent of Batswana and 54 percent of Zimbabweans could 
provide the correct names of their MPs.  In that same survey, just two tenths of one percent – 
that is, four of 2,200 South African respondents told us that they had made contact with an 
MP or gone to parliamentary outreach office in the previous year.  This was by far the lowest in 
Southern Africa (Mattes et al, 2000).  More importantly, the survey results demonstrated a 
strong regional impact of electoral systems.  The two countries with proportional 
representation, South Africa and Namibia (1 percent) had the lowest levels of citizen contact 
with national legislators.  By contrast, the figures were far higher in the countries with 
constituency-based systems: 8 percent of Zimbabweans, 7 percent of Zambians, 6 percent of 
Basotho and 5 percent of Malawians had met an MP or gone to a parliamentary outreach 
office (Botswana was the ‘outlier’ with a contact rate of just 2 percent).  While all these figures 
may sound low, there is a huge difference between one out of every ten or 20 people in 
each community with links to an elected national representative, and one out of every 100 or 
200 (Mattes, 2002). 
Thus, evidence from this and other surveys strongly suggests the need to increase rates 
of public participation and contact with formal political institutions and procedures other than 
simply voting in five-yearly elections.  Taken together, the evidence suggests that voters would 
support amending the existing electoral system to augment proportional representation with 
some form of directly elected, constituency-based representation in order to provide a 
stronger link between themselves and their representatives and to give them greater control 
over those representatives.   
The introduction of a constituency system would not, in itself, resolve all the issues 
surrounding voters’ sense that South Africa’s legislators are not adequately responsive to their 
needs.  A fuller sense of accountability may be as much a function of the extent to which 
parties deliberately tailor their policies to the needs and opinions of voters, disclose the 
sources of their funding, or interact with interest groups and organs of civil society, as it is a 
change in the electoral system.   
Nonetheless, the introduction of some form of constituency representation appears to 
be a necessary, even if insufficient step to enhance politicians’ accountability by providing 
for a direct link between voters and politicians.  It would provide citizens with a degree of 
sense of ‘ownership’ over their representatives and increase the sense of representatives to 
the voters, especially during the four-year interim between elections.  The introduction of 
constituencies would create incentives for legislators to listen to voters if only because of their 
self interest in winning their constituents’ votes at the next election. 
The popular attitudes measured by this survey suggest that eligible voters would 
support and favour the introduction of some form of Mixed Member Proportional system 
(MMP), that is, a system that maintains representativeness whilst enhancing prospects for 
accountability.  In the present South African context, a return to single member 
constituencies, even within a system of MMP, does not seem practicable (not least because 
of the problems of demarcation).  However, the introduction of multi-member constituencies 
that enable voters to choose individual candidates from lists of candidates offered by parties 
for that constituency (alongside national lists of candidates provide by the parties for national 
elections and perhaps similar provincial lists of candidates provided by parties in provincial 
elections) would be immediately feasible, especially if constituencies were geared to existing 
municipal demarcations as suggested by various options presented by Du Plessis (2002).  
It is important to stress that the introduction of multi-member constituencies within 
some form of MMP system would in no way detract from the high levels of representativeness 
achieved under the present system, precisely because it would remain proportional.  Nor, 
importantly, would it in any way prevent political parties from nominating desired proportions 
of women or candidates drawn from any other demographic groups (such as racial 
minorities) to electable positions on national / provincial or constituency lists.  In short, an MMP 
system would ensure the proportional representation of parties, as it does at the moment.  The 
responsibility for ensuring the demographic representativeness of legislators would remain with 
the political parties themselves.  Were this recommendation adopted by the ETT, then further 
thought might be given to, firstly, whether a residency requirement would be necessary for 
candidates standing for election in constituencies and, secondly, whether political parties 
should be required to follow procedures which enhance grass roots participation in selecting 
constituency candidates.  These and similar such measures would further strengthen the 
bonds between voters and their representatives in the way that this survey indicates that 
ordinary people desire.   
South Africa’s adoption of a proportional representation system in 1994 proved a vital 
step in the establishment of the present democracy.  Amendments to the status quo 
designed to enhance accountability whilst maintaining fairness, inclusiveness and simplicity – 
key aspirations of the South African electoral system as it stands (James and Hadland, 2002) – 
would go a significant way towards increasing levels of popular political participation 
between elections, and the legitimacy of the electoral system to the nation as a whole. 












(Constant) 1.608 .119  13.518 .000 
      
Demographics      
Lives in Urban Area  .0484 .027 .038 1.797 .073 
Neighborhood Consists of 
All /  Mostly Formal 
Housing 
-.0277 .021 -.031 -1.312 .190 
Female -.0295 .025 -.023 -1.203 .229 
Education .0209 .010 .049 2.091 .037 
White  -.6460 .038 -.416 -17.060 .000 
Coloured -.2430 .036 -.146 -6.759 .000 
Indian  -.2270 .051 -.090 -4.413 .000 
      
Political Attitudes      
Political Knowledge  -.0266 .035 -.017 -.765 .445 
Interested in Politics  .0620 .017 .077 3.728 .000 
Identifies With A Political 
Party  
.0792 .025 .064 3.119 .002 
Approves of Performance 
of Elected 
Representatives  
.160 .012 .272 13.844 .000 
      
Political Behaviour      
Non-Voting Political 
Participation  
-.0899 .063 -.032 -1.434 .152 
Contacts Officials and 
Leaders    
.0716 .029 .051 2.458 .014 
Voted Participation in 
Elections Since 1994 
.109 .025 .086 4.371 .000 
      
N      
Standard Error of the 
Regression 
    0.4900 
Adjusted R2     .371 
Dependent Variable: Index of perceived equality and fairness of current electoral system 
Appendix B. Determinants of evaluations of the political accountability produced by the 
current electoral system 









(Constant) 1.550 .115  13.491 .000
      
Demographics      
Lives in Urban Area  .0338 .026 .030 1.301 .193
Neighbourhood 
Consists of All /  
Mostly Formal 
Housing 
-.0594 .020 -.075 -2.921 .004
Female  .0171 .024 .015 .725 .469
Education -.0059 .010 -.015 -.606 .545
White -.3540 .037 -.253 -9.668 .000
Coloured  .0163 .035 .011 .470 .638
Indian .0469 .050 .021 .947 .344
      
Political Attitudes      
Political Knowledge  .0244 .034 .018 .726 .468
Interested in Politics  .0611 .016 .085 3.809 .000
Identifies With A 
Political Party  





.1420 .011 .268 12.711 .000
      
Political Behaviour      
Non-Voting Political 
Participation  
.0765 .061 .030 1.261 .207
Contacts Officials 
and Leaders    
-.0005 .028 .000 -.019 .985
Voted Participation 
in Elections Since 
1994 
.0926 .024 .082 3.856 .000
      
N      
Standard Error of the 
Regression 
    0.47226 
Adjusted R2     .275 
Dependent Variable: Index of  Perceived Accountability of current system 










(Constant) .364 .253  1.441 .150 
      
Demographics      
Female  .0407 .054 .016 .750 .453 
Age -.0008 .002 -.010 -.470 .638 
Education .0023 .043 .001 .054 .957 
White .1290 .089 .041 1.450 .147 
Coloured -0994 .075 -.030 -1.321 .187 
Indian -.5096 .111 -.010 -.460 .646 
      
Political Attitudes      
Interested in Politics .2260 .036 .140 6.292 .000 
Political 
Knowledge  
-.0625 .073 -.020 -.854 .393 
 
Identifies With A 
Political Party 
.190 .055 .076 3.437 .001 
Thinks current 
voting system is fair 
and equal  





.230 .056 .102 4.114 .000 
      
Political Behaviour      
Voted regularly 
since 1994  
.634 .057 .248 11.110 .000 
      
N     1931 
Standard Error of 
the Regression 
    1.0535 
Adjusted R2     .20 
Dependent Variable: Desire to Vote in 2004 
 










(Constant) -.4406 .221  -1.837 .066 
      
Demographics      
Female  .0754 .047 .035 1.594 .111 
Age .0009 .002 .013 .584 .559 
Education -.0014 .037 -.001 -.038 .970 
White -.140 .078 -.052 -1.801 .072 
Coloured -.0204 .066 -.007 -.311 .756 
Indian -.154 .096 -.036 -1.602 .109 
      
Political 
Attitudes 
     
Interested in 
Politics 
.0853 .031 .062 2.716 .007 
Political 
Knowledge  




.0915 .048 .044 1.893 .058 
Thinks current 
voting system 
is fair and 
equal  






.305 .049 .160 6.243 .000 
      
Political 
Behaviour 




.136 .050 .063 2.738 .006 
      




     
Adjusted R2     .15 
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